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COMMENT
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: Progress
Toward Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the constitutional rights of public employees in-
variably begins with Justice Holmes's famous quotation, "The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman."' Although later courts have been more sym-
pathetic to policemen2 and other public employees,' vestiges of the attitude
exemplified by Justice Holmes's statement remain.4 The purpose of this
comment is to survey the progress5 public employees have made in their
efforts to firmly establish the extent of their constitutional rights in the
employment setting and, in so doing, to point out some of the present
and potential problems facing these employees, their employers and the
courts.
Justice Holmes's holding was based on a widely-held' theory that
public employment, like other forms of government largess, was not a
right, but a privilege that the government could retract at will. Although
other traditional notions7 were cited by the courts in dealing summarily
'McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
' E.g., Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified, 425 F.2d 469,
aff'd, 425 F.2d 472 (1969).
'E.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (school teacher);
Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority, 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(transit authority employee).
'E.g., Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969).
'At least one author feels that the progress made by public employees has been
dramatic enough to be called a revolution. Leahy, From McAuliffe to McLaughlin:
A Revolution in the Law of Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 57 ILL.
BJ. 910 (1969).
'Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. Ruv. 1439, 1441 & n.7 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
' Some courts relied on the axiom that absent "a statute or ancient custom to the
contrary, executive offices are held at the will of the appointing authority, not for
life or for fixed terms." Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). Other courts applied a
"good faith" test, which seldom uncovered decisions made in bad faith. Note,
Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging Judicial Role, 66 COLUm. L. REv.
719 (1966). Still others relied on the old concept that teachers and defense workers
were keepers of the public trust whose compromise would endanger the nation.
Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions Upon Public Employment: New Departures in
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with public employee discharge cases, the right-privilege distinction was
the major basis upon which courts upheld summary dismissal of public
employees. The gradual demise of that distinction has resulted in the
progress that has been made thus far.8
A number of practical factors have produced more litigious public
employees and courts that are more receptive to their claims. The prime
factor has been the unforeseen expansion of governmental functions in
general. Governmental operations in education, defense, housing, welfare
and other fields have expanded to the point that it may have become the
basis of security for many individuals9 or at least a new kind of "prop-
erty."10 As the individual's "rights" to this new property are litigated,
as, for example, in the area of public housing, the decisions will naturally
affect the administration of other forms of governmental largess, including
employment.' 2 As governmental programs have expanded, so has gov-
ernmental employment. Exclusion from or the loss of public employment
can foreclose a person from an ever expanding segment of the job market."3
Also, public employers have become more sophisticated in personnel man-
agement and more thorough in their investigations into an employee's
personal life and beliefs.' 4 This new expertise makes it even more neces-
sary that public employees have a sufficient remedy in the event they lose
theit jobs for reasons unrelated to their on-the-job performance. Another
reason that public employees are asking for and receiving more protection
is the progress made by their counterparts in the private sector, who are
gaining greater job security and protection from arbitrary treatment 5
the Protection of First Amendment Rights, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 129 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Bruff].
' See Van Alstyne, supra note 6. Professor Van Alstyne delineates five theories
that have been used to erode the foundation of the right-privilege distinction.
They are: 1) the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions; 2) the doctrine of in-
direct effects; 3) procedural due process; 4) equal protection; and 5) bills of
attainder.
'Van Alstyne, supra note 6.10 Reich, The New Property, 73 YAr.n L.J. 733 (1964).
" E.g., Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.
1970).
See note 90 infra, and accompanying text.
Federal, state, and local governments already employ fifteen per cent of the
total civilian labor force. Bruff, supra note 7, at 129 & n.1. See also Rosenbloom,
The Constitution and the Civil Service, Some Recent Developments, Judicial and
Political, 18 U. KAn. L. Rxv. 839 (1970).
"See Creech, The Privacy of Government EPmployees, 31 LAw & CoNrEmP.
PROBLEMS 413 (1966).
., "See Note, Dismissal. of Federal Employees-The Energing Judicial Role, 66
CoLtJm. L. REv. 719 (1966).
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There are other, perhaps less significant, factors that have made public
employees more militant and the courts more receptive to their needs."0
Whatever the influence of each of these factors individually, they have, in
combination, provided the impetus for the progress discussed below.
II. PROTECTION-PAST AND PRESENT
Perhaps the best way to assess the protection against invasion of the
constitutional rights that has been and is currently being afforded public
employees is to take three employment discharge situations and examine
how courts have or might handle each of them. Section A will deal with
the problem of the employee who has been discharged for exercising a
constitutionally protected right. Usually this is a first amendment right
but may be a fifth amendment right.'8 Section B will deal with the prob-
lem of the employee who is discharged for an arbitrary or capricious
reason or for no reason at all. Section C is concerned with the employee
who is fired in a manner that is not compatible with procedural due
process.
A. Discharge in Violation of a Specific Constitutional Right
The first situation to be examined is that of the public employee who
has been discharged for his exercise of a clearly protected constitutional
right. The employee can usually obtain relief more easily in this situation
than any other because his rights have been more clearly defined by the
courts ;19 the employee has a number of constitutional doctrines and court
decisions on which to rely in asserting his constitutional rights.
The public employee discharged under these circumstances might rely
upon the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in an action for reinstate-
" These additional factors include: 1) the growth of such organizations as the
ACLU, NAACP and NEA which often subsidize court tests that individual plain-
tiffs would be unwilling or unable to undertake; 2) the increasing influence of
unions among public employees; and 3) the strength in numbers that has resulted
from the expanse in government employment. The current upheaval in educational
institutions may also be considered a factor. As will become apparent later in this
comment, discharged teachers are bringing an increasing number of suits against
their former employers. These suits are resulting in precedents that will be useful
to other government employees.
"
7E.g., McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (right to join a
union).
"
8E.g., Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (right against selfincrimination).
19 See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Einployees: A Connent
on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 751, 754 & n.14(1969).
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ment and/or for money damages.2" The doctrine can be traced back to
Frost v. Railroad Commissioner.2 In holding that California statutes
that required a trucking company to become a common carrier before
permitting it to operate its trucks on the state's highways for compensation
were unconstitutional, the Court said:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the
citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, but to uphold
an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a
surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state
threatens otherwise to withhold .... If the state may compel the sur-
render of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in
like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaran-
ties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence.
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general
rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant
it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the
state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is
that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of
constitutional rights 22
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied in public
employment cases. The earliest cases involved state statutes. In Wieman
v. Updegraftr the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that pre-
scribed a loyalty oath for all state employees.24 Wieman was followed in
Slochower v. Board of Education." In that case, a professor employed
to teach at a state college was discharged after he invoked the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination in hearings before a subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate. The Court
held unconstitutional the state statute that required his dismissal.26
" The most common action is one brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
21271 U.S. 583 (1926).
2 Id. at 593-94.2 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
2" "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employ-
ment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or dis-
criminatory." Id. at 192.
2350 U.S. 551 (1956). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
2" "The heavy hand of the statute falls alike on all who exercise their con-
1971]
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The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has recently been applied
in two very similar cases involving public employee discharges. These
cases involve state action through its agent/employer, not by statute. In
Pickering v. Board of Education," the plaintiff, a public schoolteacher in
Illinois, was dismissed for writing a letter to the local newspaper in which
he criticized the school board's handling of a bond issue. The board
found, after a full hearing, that the letter contained many false statements
and that its publication was detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district. It therefore concluded that
the interest of the school required Pickering's dismissal. Unable to de-
termine whether the Illinois Supreme Court held that the first amendment
had no applicability to the dismissal or that the particular statements were
unprotected, the Court said:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read
to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish
the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation
of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise
that has been unequivocably rejected in numerous prior decisions of
this court. . . . '[T]he theory that public employment which may be
denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of
how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.' 28
The Court went on to say that the state might have some interests as an
employer that differed from those it possessed in connection with regula-
tion of the speech of citizens in general. It then proceeded to balance the
interests of the teacher against those of the state and found that since no
showing had been made that the letter interfered with Pickering's proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom, the state had no more
interest in controlling his speech than it did in controlling similar speech
by any member of the general public.
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this [where no predominate
state interest is shown], absent proof of false statements knowingly or
recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on
stituitional privilege, the full enjoyment of which every person is entitled to receive.
Such action falls squarely within the prohibition of Wieman v. Updegraff .... "
350 U.S. at 558. Contra, Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). But
see Board of Pub. Educ. v. Intille, 401 Pa. 1, 163 A.2d 420 (1960).27391 U.S. 563 (1968). "
"Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
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issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal
from public employment. 29
In Meehan v. Macy3 " the plaintiff's employment as a policeman in
the Canal Zone was terminated after he arranged for printing and began
distributing a contemptuous, intemperate and defamatory letter and poem
lampooning the Governor of Canal Zone and his policies. He also had
made statements to the press concerning the governor's new plan to hire
foreign nationals for the police force although there was evidence that
he had been specifically requested to confine his objections to proper chan-
nels. These activities took place shortly after a series of riots in the Canal
Zone and at a time where an "aura of tension persisted, generated by
fears that renewed outbursts might erupt."' ' Meehan's subsequent dis-
charge was based on three grounds: 1) Conduct unbecoming an officer;
2) failure to obey instructions; and 3) failure to obtain clearance before
releasing for publication articles pertaining to government activities in
the Canal Zone.
22
The court's opinion is a blend of the old and new approaches to the
protection of the constitutional rights of public employees. The court
specifically rejected the Holmes statement in McAuliffe yet made it dear
that public employees have "lesser rights" than others have under the
Constitution. 3 It refused to apply strictly the test set out in New York
Times v. Sullivan8 4 although specifically asked to do so. But the court
went on to say that although the government's interests gave it some
powers to suppress or inhibit the free speech of its employees, the govern-
ment was not relieved of its obligation to define narrowly and with as
much precision as possible the speech which it prescribes. The court
examined each of the grounds for discharge in detail; sustaining charge
1, but finding charges 2 and 3 deficient. Charges 2 was found deficient
because the order inhibiting the employee's speech was not reasonably
specific. Charge 3 was found wanting because Meehan was not given
notice and because the clearance regulation had not been invoked by
the government for a long period of time. The case was remanded since
it was not clear whether the three charges had been separate or cumulative
29 Id. at 574-75.392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified, 425 F.2d 469, aff'd, 425 F.2d 472(1969).
a' 392 F.2d at 826.
82 Id. at 828.
3 Id. at 832.
8'376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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grounds for discharge. On rehearing after the Pickering decision was
handed down, the order on remand in Meehan was altered to provide for
reconsideration of charge 1 in light of Pickering and the introduction of
additional evidence. 5 The three dissenting judges found that the expanded
order on remand was unnecessary as Meehan's conduct clearly did not
come within the protection of Pickering.6
These two recent applications of the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions point out the strengths and weaknesses in the doctrine. They
should make it clear to the public employer that he may not discharge an
employee for the exercise of one of his constitutionally protected rights
unless he feels confident that the state has a predominant interest in in-
hibiting that exercise. The state's exercise of its powers should be limited
to that which is necessary to protect its interest and not inhibit other
freedoms. The cases should make it equally clear to the public employee
that the courts will protect his constitutional rights to the extent that no
superceding state interests are involved. They also sound a warning to
the lower courts that each case must be decided on its own facts. The
lower court must, in each instance, balance the interests of the individual
and the interest of the government. There is no easy formula to be
applied.3 7 For example, if Pickering's letter had criticized his immediate
supervisor or fellow teachers or had actually created enough disturbance
to affect his daily performance, the state's interest might have become
predominant."' There is already sufficient indication that Meehan's
conduct was so disruptive that he forfeited his rights.3 9 Numerous other
examples can be conceived in which compelling interests exist on both
sides. For instance, what about the teacher whose religious beliefs prevent
her from leading the class in the pledge of allegiance to the flag every-
day? What about the employee who is dismissed for both permissible and
impermissible reasons? 40  The cases and examples only indicate that
the courts will have many difficult decisions to make. The doctrine of
" 425 F.2d 469 (1968).
425 F.2d 472, 474-79 (1969).
Compare Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Consti-
tutional Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WAsr. L. REv. 4 (1964), 40 WAsHr. L.
REv. 10 (1965) with Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees:
A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 751
(1969).
" See Watts v. Seward School Bd., 454 P.2d 732 (1969), cert. denied, 38
U.S.L.W. 3311 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970).
" See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
" The problem is discussed in Note, Refusal to Rehire a Nontenure Teacher for
a Constitutionally Impermissible Reason, 1970 Wis. L. Rgv. 162.
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unconstitutional conditions is useful in prohibiting employee discharges
arising out of the exercise of a constitutionally protected right because it
avoids the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to public em-
ployment. The doctrine is limited however in that it has been applied
only in cases involving explicit constitutional rights. 1
B. The Arbitrary and Capricious Discharge
The dilemma of the public employee who is discharged for what he
considers arbitrary or capricious reasons is even worse than that of the
employee who is dismissed for the exercise of some explicit constitutionally
protected right. Unable to invoke the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions and faced with Justice Holmes's still unreversed assertion that there
is no right to government employment, it is difficult to perceive what
"life, liberty or property"' the would-be plaintiff has been deprived of
by his discharge. This situation is factually similar to that presented in
Freeman v. Gould Special School District.43 Plaintiffs in that case were
teachers whose contracts had been terminated at the end of the school
year; they alleged that their dismissals, based solely on the recommenda-
tion of their principal, were arbitrary, capricious and a denial of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.44 A majority of the court held
that the school board had an absolute right to decline to employ or re-
employ any teacher for any reason or for no reason at all as long as it
was not violative of a specific constitutional right. They found there to
be no federal question involved.
Different legal theories have been developed to overcome the problem
facing the teachers in Freeman, with varying degrees of success.4 5 The
common factor in each theory has been the attempt to shift the focus from
the "right" to the job to some other "right" or "interest"-one logical
shift is to argue that arbitrary dismissals may constitute a deprivation
of constitutionally protected rights. Once again one of Professor Van
Alstyne's erosive theories may come into play-here the doctrine of in-
direct effects. 46 The public employee's argument based on this doctrine
" For a more thorough discussion of the benefits and defects of the doctrine, see
Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1447-49.
"U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 2.
"405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
"An equal protection argument was made, but abandoned on appeal. Id. at 1157.
"Compare Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970)
with DeCanio v. School Comm., - Mass. -, 260 N.E.2d 676 (1970).
" Van Alstyne, supra note 6.
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is that permitting the employer to dismiss an employee for arbitrary and
capracious reasons will inhibit the employee in the exercise of such con-
stitutional rights as free speech, assembly or religion since the employer
will simply assign an arbitrary motive for his actions, and thereby make it
even more difficult for the employee to establish his first amendment claim.
The employee might never know for what exercise of his constitutional
rights he was fired. The principle case cited in support of this doctrine
is Shelton v. Tucker,4 7 in which the Court held unconstitutional an
Arkansas statute that required teachers to file an annual affidavit listing
every organization to which they had regularly contributed within the
preceding five years because of the chilling effect it had on the freedom
of association of the teachers. The employer's ready reply to this claim
is that the Court in Shelton recognized the teacher's position and acqui-
esced in it, using it as one of the factors against which it judged the
statute.48 Still, the argument that arbitrary dismissals could have a
chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights is sound, practical
and may be of some use to the employee.
Courts that have been unwilling to apply the doctrine of indirect
effects have found other interests worthy of constitutional protection. In
Bomar v. Keyes,49 the court found an interest in "an expectancy of con-
tinued employment." Still other courts have sought a "substantial in-
terest" besides the interest in a government job to justify invoking the
due process clause.50 Often the employee's "reputation" may furnish the
additional interest necessary."1 While this approach has produced some
results, 52 it has one major drawback. It does not give the employer,
employee or courts any standards to use in judging what interests and
in what situations due process is required.
' 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
8Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1969).
162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939,
943-44 (5th Cir. 1970).IO E.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Meredith v. Allen
County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968) (discussed infra at
p. 317).
" Id. See also Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). "Whatever
the derivation and scope of plaintiff's alleged freedom to wear a beard, it is at least
an interest of his, especially in combination with his professional reputation as a
school teacher, which may not be taken from him without due process of law."
Id. at 117-18. In still other cases, courts have been concerned that a "badge of
disloyalty" has been bestowed on the employee. Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp.
841 (E.D. Idaho 1965). Cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961).82 See cases cited in notes 50 and 51 supra.
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There is another and perhaps more manageable method for skirting
the direct issue of the right to public employment. The public employee dis-
missed for an unconvincing reason or for no reason at all can argue
that he has a constitutional right to be free from arbitrary and capricious
government action. Although apparently rejected by the eighth circuit in
Freeman, the argument has been accepted by some courts. In Johnson v.
Branch,53 plaintiff, a schoolteacher active in civil rights work who had
not had her contract renewed for the ensuing year, alleged that she had
been terminated because she had exercised her constitutional right to pro-
test racial discrimination or, alternatively, for arbitrary and capricious
reasons. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying on Frost,
summarily rejected the proposition that plaintiff could lose her job for
exercising her first amendment rights. 4 The court then proceeded to
deal with the arbitrary discharge claim. The school board had maintained
that plaintiff's contract was not renewed because she failed to follow seven
relatively insignificant school rules: The district court, upholding the
school board's decision not to renew the teacher's contract, found that
she was terminated because of her inability to perform expected extra-
curricular activities. Holding that the court's inquiry was restricted
to the reasons advanced by the school authorities, the court of appeals
reversed the district court, finding that the reasons given by the board
"were neither individually nor collectively" sufficient to justify nonrenewal
of plaintiff's contract and that they were arbitrary and capricious. Al-
though the authority of the decision on this point is greatly diminished by
the interjection of the racial discrimination issue,6 5 it can be argued that
the court recognized the right of a public employee to be free from arbi-
trary and capricious action by a public employer.5"
364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
' "We take it to be beyond cavil that the state may not force the plaintiff to
choose between exercising her legitimate constitutional rights and her right of
equality of opportunity to hold public employment." Id. at 180.
i5Id. at 182.
'o One of the cases relied upon by the court in Johnson was Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). In that case, plaintiff had been denied admission to the
state bar for failure to answer certain questions of the Board of Law Examiners
relating to his membership in the Communist Party. Plaintiff contended that there
was no evidence to support a finding of doubt as to his character and loyalty and
thus no justification for the action of the state officials. The Court said:
If this contention is correct, he has been denied the right to practice law
although there was no basis for the finding that he failed to meet the qualifica-
tions which the State demands of a person seeking to become a lawyer. Ift
this is true, California's refusal to admit him is a denial of due process and
19711
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In a recent decision, Roth v. Board of Regents,57 a district court
expressly found that there was a constitutionally protected right to be
free from arbitrary and capricious state action.5" That case involved the
failure to renew the contract of a nontenured assistant professor at a state
university. No reason was given for the nonrenewal and no hearing
was held. The issue, as stated by the court, is identical to that under
discussion in this section.
With respect to substantive protection against arbitrary non-retention,
there is some uncertainty in the present state of the law. To test the
point, we must assume a situation in which there is in fact no "First
Amendment" problem; that is, the basis for non-retention is definitely
not that the professor has exercised that freedom secured to him by
the Constitution. The question, then, is whether the Fourteenth
Amendment permits non-retention on a basis wholly without factual
support, or wholly unreasoned. 59
The court explored the decision in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy60 to be discussed below. Applying the balancing test
employed by the Court in Cafeteria Workers, the Roth court came to this
conclusion:
The balancing test of Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy compels the con-
clusion that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
the decision not to retain a professor employed by a state university
,may not rest on a basis wholly unsupported in fact, or a basis wholly
without reason. This standard is intended to be considerably less
'severe than the standard of "cause" as the latter has been applied to
professors with tenure. Unless this substantial distinction between the
two standards is recognized in case-by-case application of the constitu-
tional doctrine here enunciated, the rationale for the underlying doctrine
will be gravely impaired. To be more direct, in applying the constitu-
tional d6ctrine, the court will bebound to respect basis for non-retention
enjoying minimal factual support and basis for non-retention supported
by subtle reasons.
of equal protection of the laws because both arbitrary and discriminatory.
353 U.S. at 262.
310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
Accord, Roberts v. Lake Cent. School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind.
1970) ; Gouge v. Joint School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970) ; Lafferty
v. Carter, 310 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Wis. 1970). Contra, DeCanio v. School Comm.,
Mass. -, 260 N.E.2d 676 (1970).
"' 310 F. Supp. at 976.
: 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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In deciding to afford to professors in a state university substantive
protection against arbitrary non-retention, I am strengthened by an
awareness that this is consistent with the development of the law with
respect to public employment generally. The time is past in which
public employment is to be regarded as a "privilege" which may be
extended upon any conditions which public officials may choose to
impose.0 '
The constitutional doctrine espoused in Roth and arguably in Johnson
has not been expressly accepted by the Supreme Court.62 It does, however,
present a viable solution to the problem of the public employee discharged
for arbitrary and capricious reasons. It has the same benefit as the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions; it avoids a direct challenge to the
proposition that there is no constitutional right to public employment.
It also features essentially the same test in which the interests of the
individual, as employee, are balanced against the interests of the govern-
ment acting as employer.
C. Discharge Without Procedural Due Process
The last situation to be discussed is that of the public employee who is
discharged without notice, a hearing or in any other manner that is in-
consistent with procedural due process. The problem of procedural pro-
tection could have been discussed under each of the two previous topics
but will be dealt with separately for two reasons. First, some authors have
suggested that the right to procedural due process is in and of itself a
substantial enough interest that its denial warrants redress. 3 Second,
decisions determining the extent to which procedural due process is re-
quired in employer/employee relations will, in a practical sense, directly
affect the protection afforded the public employee's other constitutional
rights. The manner of discharge may be as important as the reason.
There is dicta in some federal court decisions to support the contention
that even a governmental privilege cannot be withheld or withdrawn
81310 F. Supp. at 979. As the quotation indicates, the most troublesome argument
raised in opposition to the application of a rule such as Roth's is that the courts
are imposing "tenure" on governmental employers. The opinion deals with the
problem in a straightforward manner and its caveat concerning the misapplication
of the constitutional doctrine should not be disregarded.
'2 But see the discussion of Cafeteria Workers infra p. 316.
" E.g., Rosenbloom, The Constitution and the Civil Service, Some Recent De-
vdlopments, Judicial and Political, 18 KAN. L. Rnv. 839 (1970).
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without procedural due process.0 It is not unreasonable to argue that
procedural due process is an interest which, alone, or in combination with
employment by the government is substantial enough to come within the
ambit of "life, liberty, or property." It is also important to note that
there is a growing body of case law holding that other forms of govern-
ment largess cannot be denied without due process of law."
Discharge without procedural protection is subject to another attack.
It has the same if not more of a chilling effect on the exercise of first
amendment rights as the arbitrary or capricious dismissal." An excellent
example of the application of the doctrine of indirect effects in a case in-
volving denial of procedural due process to an employee is Albaum v.
Carey,T in which a teacher was not accorded tenure after completing his
probationary period with high marks in every field. Plaintiff asserted
that he was denied tenure because of certain of his expressions and asso-
ciations. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied on the grounds that
plaintiff had alleged facts constituting a deprivation under color of state
law or authority of a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.""
In the course of its opinion, the court pointed out that the state claimed
that the power to deny tenure was completely unrestricted and that New
York law gave substance to the plaintiff's view that the Superintendent
had unlimited power in determining which teachers were accorded tenure.
The court said:
The mere statement of the defense's position that the job of school
teacher in public schools is not life, liberty, or property within the mean-
"" "The fact that one may not have a legal right to get or keep a government post
does not mean that he can be adjudged ineligible illegally." Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951). See also Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); Williams v. Zuckert,
371 U.S. 531, 534 (1962); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1961) ; United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd,
344 U.S. 561 (1953). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 6.
" Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (welfare benefits); Escalera v.
New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (housing);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (dismissal of student from
Merchant Marine Academy); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (dismissal of student from
university); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (deprivation of
social security benefits); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp.
485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (denial of right to participate in high school athletics);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (dismissal of
student from college).
6' See p. 309 supra.
283 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
68Id. at 9.
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ing of the fourteenth amendment, and that therefore no fair process is
due the teacher, establishes its untenability.69
The court noted that previous teacher cases had involved the overbreadth
of a substantive prohibition and found that the allowance of such broad
discretion in the Superintendent created the same constitutional de-
ficiency :0 "When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him
his position, one necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful zone...."71
The argument that procedural due process should be denominated a
"liberty" as the word is used in the fourteenth amendment is not un-
appealing. It, too, shifts the emphasis from the right to a government
job to the protection of fundamental liberties. But, viewed in proper
perspective, such an interpretation is not consistent with the language of
the amendment. If "procedural due process" is substituted for "liberty"
the argument boils down to the assertion that the public employee may not
be deprived of due process without due process. This is not to say that
procedural due process does not have a place in this discussion-it is to
point out that it may be used in somewhat misguided efforts to circum-
vent Justice Holmes's holding and that that is not the proper place for it.
Procedural due process is an instrument to insure that fundamental
liberties are not illegally usurped or dissipated. This is best illustrated by
the Roth case. After determining that a public employee could be dis-
charged neither for reasons which abridged his fundamental liberties nor
for arbitrary or capricious reasons, the court said:
The latter comment brings me to a conclusion which follows in-
exorably from what I have said. Substantive constitutional protection
for a university professor against non-retention in violation of his First
Amendment rights or arbitrary non-retention is useless without pro-
cedural safeguards.72
The Roth decision has not and will not be met with immediate
acceptance. In DeCanio v. School Committee of Boston,7' six nontenured
teachers were dismissed for teaching in a "liberation school" when the
public school in which they taught was temporarily closed by demonstrators
I09 d.
oId. The court in Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969), was
also concerned with the absence of predetermined standards. But see note 73 infra
and accompanying text.
" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
" 310 F. Supp. at 979-80.
'- Mass. -, 260 N.E.2d 676 (1970).
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at the beginning of the school term. The teachers argued that they could
not be dismissed without a hearing. The court, following "the greater
weight of authority,"7 4 rejected the reasoning of Roth and held that no
hearing was required for nontenured teachers.75
Still, the extent to which procedural safeguards are required in public
employee discharge cases does directly affect the protection afforded and
thus deserves separate treatment. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy,8 the Supreme Court set out the test by which courts
are to determine the scope of the due process requirement in public em-
ployment. Rachel Brawner was a short order cook at a cafeteria operated
by a private concessionaire on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory.
She was summarily required to turn in her identification badge and was
thereafter denied admission to the Gun Factory. The only explanation
given was that she failed to meet security requirements. When her em-
ployer, at the request of the union, sought to arrange a meeting with the
officials of the Gun Factory, the request was denied. Her union then filed
an action to compel the return of her identification badge so that she
could resume her former employment. In a five-to-four decision the
Court held that notice and a hearing was not required "under the cir-
cumstances of this case."7 Although the majority opinion contains some
inconsistencies,78 it clearly states the test to be applied in determining
when and to what extent the public employees are entitled to due process.
The Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing in every
conceivable case of government impairment of private interests ...
The very natfre" of due process negates any concept of inflexible pro-
cedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.... [C] on-
sideratibn of what-procedures due process may require under anygiven
set of :circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well 'as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action.79
The majority found that the government's interest in maintaining
security at the gun factory outweighed Rachel Brawner's right to be
employed as a short-order cook at "one isolated and specific military in-
7
" Id. at 681.
" See also Bonner v. Texas City Ind. School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Tex.
1969).
"367 U.S. 886 (1961).
'Id. at 894.7"Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 977 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
7° 367 U.S. at 894-95.
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stallation."' 0 The majority also found that the government's action had
not operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy on the plaintiff.
The dissent specifically disagreed with the latter point but more important,
it said:
It [the majority] holds that the mere assertion by government that
exclusion is for a valid reason forecloses further inquiry. That is,
unless the government official is foolish enough to admit what he is
doing-and few will be so foolish after today's decision-he may employ
"security requirement" as a blind behind which to dismiss at will for
the most discriminatory of causes.... Such a result in effect nullifies
a substantive right-not to be arbitrarily injured by Government-
which the Court purports to recognize. What sort of right is it which
enjoys absolutely no procedural protection?81
The Cafeteria Workers test has been applied in Birnbaum v. Trusse82
and Meredith v. Allen Co. War Memorial Hospital Commissioner.m3 In
the former, a doctor was dismissed from his employment at a hospital for
alleged anti-Negro bias and in the latter a doctor was refused reappoint-
ment without proper notice and a hearing. In Meredith the court held that
plaintiff had no constitutional right to practice his profession at a public
facility, but that due process and equal protection were limits on the
manner of his exclusion. The court found, after weighing such factors
as the government's need to act summarily and the extent that an em-
ployee would be harmed by the dismissal, that the circumstances required
that the doctor be given a hearing. In the Birnbaum case, the second
circuit concluded that where a doctor could show a substantial interest
other than his public employment, he could not be dismissed for arbitrary
reasons and was entitled to a "procedure calculated to determine whether
legitimate grounds do exist.""4
Cafeteria Workers, Birnbaum and Meredith seem to indicate that
the test to determine the scope and extent of the due process requirement
is the same test applied in section A and B above. In many cases this may
be true, but the tests are different. Reasons that may ultimately sustain
a discharge may not sustain action without a hearing. Under the pro-
cedural test, the government must show an interest of sufficient weight to
80 Id. at 896.
81 367 U.S. at 900.
371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968).
8, 371 F.2d at 678-79.
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justify its acting summarily. For example, Mr. Meehan's activities may
have warranted his discharge, but if he had been discharged without a
hearing or notice, the government might not have been able to establish
that its interests were sufficient enough to sustain the summary action.
One of the real benefits to be derived from requiring procedural due
process is the protection from discharge or other punitive action that is
not based on fact or is based on erroneous fact. To deprive its employees
of this benefit by not giving them a hearing, the government should have
to show a very substantial interest.
Not only the employees, but also the courts derive benefits from a more
expansive application of due process requirements, a fact that should not
be overlooked in determining the scope and extent of the requirement in
each case. These benefits stem from the unenviable situation in which the
courts find themselves. Courts do not want to become a review board pr
a super NLRB to second guess public employers each time a public em-
ployee is discharged. But they do have to protect the public employee's
rights. Expansive procedural requirements can facilitate the court's work
or at least diminish the number of cases actually litigated. 5 Requirements
of notice, a hearing and perhaps cross examination will have a number
of salutory affects. First of all, the employer will be reluctant to act
arbitrarily or to deprive the employee of his fundamental liberties when
his actions will be exposed to public scrutiny. Political redress is facili-
tated."' The employee who is given an adequate explanation of the reasons
for his discharge is less likely to resort to the courts. If the employer
does have a legitimate reason for discharging him, the employee may not
want the resulting publicity. If the reasons are not detrimental, the em-
ployee's chances of future employment have not been harmed, 7 Notice
and a hearing will also serve to clarify the facts and may result in speedier
and less expensive court proceedings as these cases will probably lend
themselves to summary judgment motions. In this regard, it is in-
5 The courts can, of course, limit the number of cases coming to them by apply-
ing the rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort to the
courts will be allowed. However, this rule should not be woodenly applied, especially
in civil rights cases. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1969).
Stricter application of rules such as the requirement that limitations on the exercise
of fundamental liberties be spelled out may encourage employers to adopt procedures
that will eliminate situations that might give rise to litigation.
"Van Alstyne, supra note 6.
"' The effect of the dismissal on future employment is often a concern of the
employee and the courts. E.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961).
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teresting to note that in Roth the plaintiff's summary judgment motion
was partially granted on the basis of the denial of procedural protection.
A decision on the issues of arbitrary dismissal and deprivation of first
amendment rights was reserved.88
The main objection to requiring notice and hearing is the burden placed
upon the employer.89 It should be noted, however, that the system has
proved workable in the private sector. It is also significant that in
Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority,0 the court required the
Authority, which controlled the housing of 144,000 families, to afford those
tenants whose leases it wished to terminate the following procedural safe-
guards: 1) the tenant must be allowed to see the folder upon which the
decision to terminate was based; 2) the decision must be based on evidence
produced at a hearing and the decision must state the reasons for termina-
tion; 3) the tenant must have the right to confront and crossexamine
a witness; and 4) the Authority must disclose the rules and guidelines its
panel uses in making termination decisions. Few employers could argue
that they would be more burdened than the housing authority by the
application of such due process requirements. 9'
The issues raised by the application of due process requirements
to employment relations will not revolve solely around notice and a hear-
ing. For example, in Taylor v. New York City Transit Authority, 2 the
court held that an employee who had been dismissed after a hearing had
been denied procedural due process because of the "conflict of interests"
of one of the members of the Transit Authority who ruled on his case
on appeal. Although the case was dismissed due to plaintiff's failure to
avail himself of the adequate state remedies open to him, the court's
holding on the constitutional question could raise significant problems for
state agencies such as school boards, which act as prosecutor, judge and
jury. Other problems will certainly arise but a full discussion of them
would furnish material for a separate article.
III. CONCLUSION
The constitutional rights of public employees do receive more protec-
tion today than in the past. If the public employee still has no constitu-
88 310 F. Supp. at 983.
" Thaw v. Board of Educ., 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970).
"0 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
" See also, Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (procedural due
process required in teacher nonrenewal case).
" 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
f 9711
